Who Really Benefits from Ghana’s Lithium Deal?

Ghana’s entry into the global lithium market should have marked a turning point in how the country captures value from its natural resources. Instead, the decision to slash the royalty rate on the Ewoyaa Lithium Project from 10 per cent to 5 per cent has reignited long-standing concerns about resource governance, fiscal prudence and whose interests ultimately shape extractive sector agreements.

IMANI Center for Policy and Education’s warning that Ghana could lose about US$21 million annually from this single decision is not just a technical critique; it is a serious indictment of the policy choices being made at a formative stage of Ghana’s critical minerals industry. Lithium is not an ordinary commodity. It is a strategic mineral central to the global energy transition, electric vehicles and battery storage. Countries that possess it are being urged to negotiate smarter, not softer.

At the heart of the controversy is the justification offered for the royalty cut: that falling global lithium prices threatened the project’s viability. IMANI’s analysis, grounded in the project’s own Definitive Feasibility Study, casts significant doubt on this claim. With an all-in sustaining cost estimated at just US$610 per tonne, Ewoyaa ranks among the lowest-cost lithium projects globally. Even under pessimistic price assumptions, the numbers suggest the project could remain profitable while paying the originally agreed 10 per cent royalty.

If this is the case, then the reduction to the statutory minimum appears less like an economic necessity and more like a policy concession. Moreover, concessions of this nature have consequences. Mineral royalties are not a penalty on investors; they are the state’s most direct compensation for the depletion of non-renewable resources. Halving them effectively transfers future public revenue to private shareholders, many of whom are foreign, with little evidence of a commensurate national gain.

The projected loss of US$21 million a year may seem modest in isolation, but over the life of the mine and in the context of Ghana’s persistent revenue constraints, it is significant. More worrying is the precedent it sets. Ghana is only beginning its lithium journey. The terms agreed today will shape expectations for future projects, potentially locking the country into a pattern of undervaluation at a time when critical minerals are becoming increasingly scarce and geopolitically important.

The government’s broader development narrative emphasises domestic resource mobilisation, fiscal consolidation and value for money. Against that backdrop, weakening the state’s revenue position on a high-potential asset appears contradictory. It also risks eroding public trust, particularly when citizens are being asked to accept higher taxes, utility tariffs and spending restraint.

IMANI’s call for a sliding-scale royalty regime deserves serious consideration. Such frameworks are widely used in resource-rich jurisdictions to balance investor competitiveness with fair state participation, ensuring governments benefit more during price booms while offering relief during downturns. A minimum floor of 10 per cent would have signalled confidence in Ghana’s bargaining position and respect for the strategic nature of lithium.

Ultimately, the question Ghana must confront is simple but uncomfortable: are we positioning lithium as a catalyst for long-term national development, or repeating old extractive habits under a new mineral label? Decisions taken now will echo for decades. If Ghana gets lithium wrong at the start, the cost will not just be measured in lost dollars, but in lost opportunity.